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by Harry C. Storm
"There can be no binding, and very little helpful prece-
dent found in the decisions of the courts on this subject,
because essentially each case must depend upon its pe-
culiar circumstances..." So saying, the Maryland Court
of Appeals in Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 267-
268, 145 A. 614, 616 (1929), expressed the difficulty of
applying the relevant legal standard in child custody
cases. That standard, the "best interests of the child,"
applies both to disputes between the biological parents,
Hall v. Triche, 258 Md. 385, 266 A.2d 20 (1970), and
those between a biological parent and a third party. De-
Grange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 254 A.2d 353 (1969);
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
Historical Background
The "best interests of the child," although currently
well-embedded in Maryland law as being the court's "pa-
ramount consideration" in child custody cases, Glick v.
Glick, 232 Md. 244, 248, 192 A.2d 791, 794 (1963), is a
doctrine of relatively recent vintage. Historically speaking,
the "best interest of the child" standard is the result of a
legal and sociological evolution brought about by con-
tinually changing attitudes concerning the relationship of
father, mother, child and state. Beginning with the Ro-
man civil law, which was guided by the quasi-legal doc-
trine of patria potestas, and continuing through the de-
cline of the Roman Empire, it was recognized that the
father had an absolute right to the custody and services of
his children. Shepherd, Soloman's Sword: Adjudication
of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 151, 158
(1974)(hereinafter Shepherd); Comment, Best Interests
of the Child: Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD.
L. REV. 641, (1978) (hereinafter Maryland Child
Custody Disputes). This special interest of the father was
later subtly incorporated into feudal English law, which
recognized that child custody belonged to the parent
entitled to convey and bequeath property. Since that
parent was almost exclusively the father, his absolute
right to custody remained virtually unimpaired. 1 Brosky
and Alford, Sharpening Soloman's Sword: Current Con-
1 It is interesting to note that "it was not until the Victorian Era that a
father lost a custody dispute in England. The dubious award for 'first
loser' was presented to the famous poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-
1822) by Lord Eldon in Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (ch.
1817). Lord Eldon described Shelley's atheistic beliefs as 'vicious and
immoral' and refused to give him custody of his children." Montgom-
ery County Dept. of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 415 n.
8, 381 A.2d 1160 n. 8.
siderations in Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683,
684 (1977)(hereinafter Brosky and Alford).
By the end of the Seventeenth Century, however, as
child custody jurisdiction became vested in the English
chancery courts, the developing doctrine of parens pat-
riae crystallized to protect persons under a disability.
Shepherd, supra at 159; Brosky and Alford, supra at 684.
This doctrine became part of the law of the various states
in this country, and eventually became the basis upon
which the states could exercise authority to affect child
custody. 2 Turner v. Melton, 194 Kan. 732, 735, 402
P.2d 126,128 (1965); Maryland Child Custody Disputes,
supra at 642 n. 4. Thus, with the advent of parens pat-
riae, courts rejected the notion that children were merely
"chattels" of their fathers, and instead shifted their atten-
tion to the interests and well-being of the child. See,
Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services v. Sanders,
38 Md. App. at 416, 381 A.2d at 1161; Maryland Child
Custody Disputes, supra at 641.
The emergence of parens patriae, however, did not
completely eliminate all traces of patria potestas, as courts
continued to recognize special custodial rights in the
father. In Maryland, for example, despite the Court of
Appeals' recognition as early as 1878 that the "welfare of
the child" was the "primary object" to be attained, Hill v.
Hill, 49 Md. 450, 458 (1878), subsequent cases con-
2 Speaking of the authority of the state to protect its children, the Court
of Appeals stated in Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468 that
"[t] his principle [parens patriae] is based upon the theory that, while
the law of nature gives to parents the right to the custody of their own
children, a child from the time of birth owes allegiance to the State,
and the State in return is obligated to regulate the custody of the child
whenever necessary for its welfare."
tinued to speak of the father's "special interest." Carter v.
Carter, 156 Md. 500, 505, 144 A. 490, 492 (1929). This
''special interest" was based on the notion that the father,
having the sole duty to support, protect and educate his
children, was entitled to a correlative right to custody and
services. Boggs v. Boggs, 138 Md. 422, 431,114 A. 474,
477 (1921).
In 1929, however, the Maryland legislature statutorally
eliminated the rationale upon which the father's "special
interest" was based. It was provided that the father and
mother were to be equally charged with the "care, nur-
ture, welfare and education" of the child, and that neither
parent would have a superior right to custody. 1929
Maryland Laws, ch. 561, §1 codified as MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 72A, §I (Cum. Supp. 1929) (current version at Cum.
Supp. 1978). But while this statute was intended to eli-
minate any "natural right" of the father, as late as 1946
the Court of Appeals spoke of the father's "natural right"
to the custody of his children. Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md.
358, 362, 50 A.2d 128, 130 (1946)(dispute between
biological father and grandfather).
More interesting than the continued recognition of the
father's "natural right", however, was the emergence in
1948 of a matemal preference, expressed in the form of a
presumption, which favored the mother over the father
when the dispute concerned the custody of a child of
"tender years." Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 408, 62
A.2d 293, 298 (1948). The Court of Appeals subse-
quently explained that "since the mother is the natural
guardian of the young and immature, custody is ordinari-
ly awarded to her at least temporarily, in legal contests
between parents when other things are equal . . . pro-
vided the mother is a fit and proper person to have
custody." Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442,
446 (1960). In light of the court's implicit recognition in
Dunnigan that the paternal preference doctrine was in-
compatible with Art. 72A §1, and the Court's recent
reference to the "natural right" of the father, 187 Md. at
362, 50 A.2d at 130, adoption of the tender years pre-
sumption is surprising. Maryland Child Custody Disputes,
supra at 651-52. The presumption was consistently ap-
plied, however, see, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md.
327, 331, 207 A.2d 481 483 (1965); Roussey v. Rous-
sey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956), until
the recent Court of Special Appeals decision in McAn-
drews v. McAndrews, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081
(1978). That case sounded the death knell for the "ten-
der years" presumption by holding that the legislature's
1974 amendment to Art. 72A, §1 provides that "in any
custody proceeding, neither parent shall be given prefer-
ence solely because of his or her sex."
Thus, in light of McAndrews, Maryland law is currently
neutral and "presumption free' when the custody dispute
concerns the rights of the natural parents inter sese.
When the dispute concers the rights of the natural parent
vis-a-vis some third party, however, Maryland retains the
common law presumption that the right of either natural
parent is generally superior to that of the third party, 38
Md. App. at 416, 381 A.2d at 1161; Ross v. Hoffman,
280 Md. 172, 177, 372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1977).
Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes
Parent-third party custody disputes arise in a variety of
ways, although most frequently the dispute follows the
death of a parent who had the sole custody of the child.
Comment, Alternative to "Parental Right" in Child Cus-
tody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L. J.
151 (1963) (hereinafter Alternatives). Typically in these
cases, the non-parent, usually a step-parent, grandparent
or close relative, assumes custody following the custodial
parent's death. See, Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184,
148 A.2d 387 (1959). Later, often several years later, the
non-custodial biological parent requests that the child be
delivered to him. When the third party refuses, the biolo-
gical parent seeks judicial relief. Alternatives, supra at 151
n. 4.
As in disputes between the natural parents, the "best
interests of the child" standard governs disputes between
the natural parent and the third party, 254 Md. at 242-43,
254 A.2d at 354; 219 Md. at 188-89, 148 A.2d at 389;
199 Md. at 350-51, 86 A.2d at 468. Where the dispute
centers on the rights of a parent versus a non-parent,
however, the "best interest" standard takes on an added
dimension, because of the presumption that the child's
best interests will be served in the custody of the natural
parent. Thus, while the parents no longer have an "abso-
lute legal right" to the custody of their children, neverthe-
less, there persists that part of the common law that
declares that the "rights of either parent is ordinarily
superior to that of anyone else." 280 Md. at 177, 372
A.2d at 586. This superior right, however, is not based
upon any "sympathetic concern for the parent, nor upon
parental rights." Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577,
583, 353 A.2d 641, 645 (1976). Instead, it is based upon
the belief tht normally the parent's affections for the child
are "strong and potent", and that this leads to a desire to
care for and raise the child which is greater than that
ordinarily displayed by a third party. 219 Md. at 188, 148
A.2d at 389. The presumption, therefore, is merely "a
judicial device which shifts the burden of proof to the
non-parent seeking custody and recognizes that the
child's best interest is usually served in the custody of its
natural parents." 30 Md. App. at 583, 353 A.2d at 645.
See also, Alternatives, supra at 154 n. 18.
To refute this "parental right" presumption, the non-
parent must prove that the parent is unfit to have custody
of the child, or that exceptional circumstances exist that
would render parental custody deleterious to the child's
FORUM
best interest. 38 Md. App. at 417, 381 A.2d at 1162.
Absent such proof, the court need not inquire into the
child's best interests, and custody will be awarded to the
biological parent. The liklihood of the third party not
producing evidence of "unfitness" or "exceptional cir-
cumstances", however, is remote. Thus, the child's best
interests will in fact be determinative of the controversy's
outcome.
The third party has proved "parental unfitness" by
presenting evidence of the natural parent's abandonment
of the child, Schroeder v. Filbert, 41 Neb. 745, 60 N.W.
89 (1894); the natural parent's unsatisfactory moral char-
acter, Bradley v. Bennett, 168 Ala. 240, 53 So. 262
(1910); 219 Md. at 187, 148 A.2d at 389; and, the
natural parent's unsuitable home environment, Id. at
187, 148 A.2d at 389. But while the opinions repeatedly
speak of "parental unfitness" as a basis for overcoming
the presumption favoring the natural parent, cases involv-
ing only parental unfitness are rare. Rather, most of the
Maryland cases turn on the existence vel non of "excep-
tional circumstances", see, e.g., 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d
582 (1977); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d
660 (1958), or on a combination both of "parental unfit-
ness" and "exceptional circumstances." See, e.g., Diet-
rich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 43 A.2d 186 (1945).
Ross, supra, presents the classic case of "exceptional
circumstances." '3 In that case the parent, Mrs. Ross, in
order to work an all-night job, hired Mrs. Hoffman to
babysit her three and one-half month old daughter,
Melinda. Initially, Mrs. Ross would leave Melinda at the
Hoffman residence late at night and would return for the
child early in the morning. After several weeks, however,
Mrs. Ross found herself unable to care for Melinda during
the day, and as a result decided to leave the child with the
Hoffmans throughout the week. Within one month Mrs.
Ross stopped keeping the child even on weekends and
holidays; instead, Melinda remained with the Hoffmans
permanently. Over the next eight and one-half years,
Mrs. Ross' visits and financial support for Melinda were
sporadic. In fact, over this period of time, the most the
mother ever contributed towards her child's support in
any one year was $540.00, and in at least one year
contributed nothing. Upon her re-marriage and procure-
ment of steady employment eight and one-half years
later, however, Mrs. Ross sought to reclaim her daughter.
The Hoffmans resisted by filing a petition for custody in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
The chancellor, relying heavily upon the testimony of
the doctor who had examined the child, concluded that
rather than risk placing Melinda in a new environment,
3 There was no question respecting the "fitness of the parties to have
custody of the child." Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 180, 372 A.2d at
588.
the stability of which was uncertain, it was better that the
child remain in the loving atmosphere where she con-
cededly performed well. See, Ross, supra.
Summarizing the factors to be evaluated in determining
whether "exceptional circumstances" exist, the Court of
Appeals noted that previous decisions had considered the
length of time the child had been away from the biologic-
al parent; the age of the child when care was assumed by
the third party; the possible emotional effect on the child
of a change of custody; 4 the period of time which elapsed
before the parent sought to reclaim the child; the nature
and strength of the ties between the child and the third
party custodian; the intensity and genuineness of the
parent's desire to have the child; and, the stability and
certainty as to the child's future in the custody of the
parent. 280 Md. at 191, 372 A.2d at 587.
Finding practically all of the above circumstances pre-
sent, and that the chancellor did not clearly abuse his
discretion in continuing custody of Melinda in the Hoff-
mans, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
chancellor and the Court of Special Appeals, stating that
[i] n our prior decisions not all of the factors which were
considered from time to time in determining the exist-
ence of exceptional circumstances have appeared in
one case. Here, however, practically all of them were
present ... There being [such] exceptional circumst-
ances rebutting the presumption that custody in the
mother was in the best interest of the child, the chan-
cellor properly considered who should be awarded
custody in order to subserve the child's best interest.
His conclusion, that custody in the Hoffmans was in the
child's best interest was founded upon sound legal
principles and was based upon factual findings that
were not clearly erroneous.
280 Md. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
Although Ross v. Hoffman serves as a judicial checklist
of exceptional circumstances, it should be noted that this
list is in no way exclusive, as there are other factors that
the chancellor may consider. For example, "the court
may look to the auxillary services of psychiatrists, psycho-
logists, and trained social workers. . ." 5 280 Md. at 191,
4 The "emotional attachments" that the child may develop for the third
party as a result of the third party's attention to the child's needs for
"physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation", has
been termed "psychological parenthood." See, Goldstein, Freud &
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). The judicial
preference for the biological parents and the "influential and controv-
ersial" Maryland Child Custody Disputes, supra at 660 n. 113
"psychological parenthood" concept have recently clashed. Com-
pare, Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. at 589-93, 353 A.2d at 648-50
(Davidson, J., dissenting) (urging acceptance of "psychological parent-
hood" concept) with Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services v.
Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978) (rejecting the
"psychological parenthood" concept as the sole consideration in child
custody disputes).
5 It has been suggested that the increasing reliance upon the use of
372 A.2d at 593. And, "where the child is able to form a
rational judgment," 199 Md. at 353, 86 A.2d at 469, its
desire will also be given special consideration. 6 In es-
sence, the court considers all those factors affecting the
"training, development, morals and happiness of the
child," 199 Md. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468, and if based
upon such evidence the court determines that the "best
interest of the child" would be served in the custody of
the non-parent, the court in its sound discretion will so
decree.
Appellate Review
Once the chancellor makes a custodial determination,
such determination will be subject to three distinct aspects
of appellate review. 280 Md: at 185, 372 A.2d at 590.
The first aspect relates to the factual findings. The review-
ing court, whether it be the Court of Special Appeals or
the Court of Appeals, will accept the chancellor's findings
unless it determines that such findings were "clearly
erroneous." Thus, when reviewing the facts as to which
party should have custody, the chancellor, and not the
appellate court, should, in the absence of abuse, have the
ultimate exercise of judgment.
The second aspect of review relates to the chancellor's
statement of the law. 280 Md. at 186, 372 A.2d at 591. If
the reviewing court finds that the chancellor committed a
legal error, "further proceedings in the trial court will
ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be
harmless." Id. at 186, 372 A.2d at 591; Davis v. Davis,
280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, 234 (1977).
Finally, the appellate court will examine the chancel-
lor's ultimate conclusion. If the court determines that such
conclusion was "founded upon sound legal principles
and based upon factual findings that [were] not clearly
erroneous, such findings should be disturbed only if there
was a clear abuse of discretion." 280 Md. at 186, 372
A.2d at 591. The reviewing court is not free to "exercise
its best judgment in determining whether the conclusion
of the chancellor was the best one for the welfare, benefit
and interest of the child." Rather, the court must examine
the chancellor's ultimate conclusion, and if that conclu-
sion is not the result of a "clear abuse of discretion," it
should not be disturbed.
experts trained in the behavioral sciences indicates an increased
awareness of the emotional and psychological ramifications of child
custody decisions. Maryland Child Custody Disputes, supra at 667 n.
146.
6 On the issue of when a child's wishes should be consulted, the Court
of Appeals has stated that
... we adopt the rule that there is no specific age of a child at which
his wishes should be consulted and given weight by the court. The
matter depends upon the extent of the child's mental development.
The desires of the child are consulted, not because of any legal right
to decide the question of custody, but because the court should know
them in order to be better able to exercise its discretion wisely.
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. at 353, 86 A.2d at 459 (1952).
The World is So Full of A
Number of Things...
by Lu Clark
When I first became a mother, my whole perception of
the world underwent a radical change: the world was
inhabited with dangerous instrumentalities ready to hurt
my child; it was peopled with rapists and child molesters
and around every corner lurked a serious illness, or at
least a runny nose.
As frightening as the world was for me then, as vigilant
as I had to be to maintain the well-being of my child, it
was duck soup compared to what law school has done to
me.
No more can I go through a day blithely unaware
-now that my children have grown larger and stronger
than I-of the dangers that just daily living expose. No
more can I engage in the simplest activities without
searching for ultimate conclusions or at least balancing
the alternatives. No more can I read without trying to
subdivide into 1., 2., 3. or (a), (b) and (c). No more can I
see a child crying without wondering if it is being abused.
No more can I see a drunk in a doorway without thinking
"Rogue and Vagabond." No more can I see a river
without pondering avulsion and accretion. I feel obligated
to read the fine print-even on dinner menus.
Letter writing has become hazardous. Is that piece of
gossip libelous? Bus riding is treacherous. Shouldn't both
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